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CRIMINALISATION WITHOUT AN
OBJECT: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON
THE MUSLIM WOMEN (PROTECTION
OF RIGHTS ON MARRIAGE) ACT, 2019
—Shraddha Chaudhary*

The invalidation of triple talaq by the Supreme Court of India
triggered the enactment of the Muslim Women (Protection
of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019. The paper demonstrates
the superfluous and arbitrary nature of the Act in light of
the Supreme Court’s decision to strip triple talaq of its
power to repudiate a marriage. Drawing from the rich and
varied theories of criminal law in Anglo-American legal
discourse, the paper argues that the criminalisation of triple talaq lacks theoretical foundation and is wholly unjustified. Finally, the paper sets the criminalisation of triple
talaq within the context of the social and material vulnerabilities of Muslim women, and the political dominance of
the right-wing Hindutva in India, arguing that it is likely to
cause significant harm by exposing India’s Muslim minority further to the State’s coercive powers. For these reasons, the criminalisation of triple talaq requires urgent
reconsideration.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Talaq-e-biddat, also known as triple talaq, is a practice under Muslim
Personal Law that allows Muslim husbands to divorce their wives unilaterally,
instantly, and irrevocably without fault. The practice of triple talaq was invalidated by the Supreme Court of India in 2017. Following this, the government
of India enacted The Muslim Women Protection of Rights on Marriage Act
(‘2019 Act’), which criminalised the practice of triple talaq.
Considering the apparent anti-Muslim bias in the Indian legal system1 and
police force,2 legislation that targets India’s Muslim minority can easily become
a tool for rampant state persecution. This socio-political reality necessitates an
analysis of the criminalisation of triple talaq. What is being criminalised? Is
1

2

A recent study of decisions by district court judges in India found no in-group bias in the
lower judiciary on the axes of religion or gender. See, Ash, Asher et al, ‘India’s District Court
Judges Don’t Show In-group Bias Against Women, Muslims: Study’ (The Print, 13 January
2021) <https://theprint.in/opinion/indias-district-court-judges-dont-show-in-group-bias-againstwomen-muslims-study/584424/> accessed 5 October 2021.
However, as the study itself notes, this does not indicate that these groups do not suffer
bias in the legal system. “For example, it is possible that both Muslim and non-Muslim judges
discriminate against Muslims… It is also possible that arrests and/or charges disproportionately target Muslims, or that judges exhibit bias based on defendant caste or income”. This
latter concern is especially relevant, given that deep structural inequalities expose minority
communities to ghettoisation, poverty, and increased policing. On this, see: Roshan Kishore,
‘Do Muslims in India Suffer a Bias when it Comes to Imprisonment, Conviction?’ (Livemint,
23
November
2021)
<https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/93JZlySuxiVURtuqbA61TN/
Do-Muslims-in-India-suffer-a-bias-when-it-comes-to-imprisonm.html> accessed 5 October
2021;
For a discussion on judicial complicity in encouraging religious stereotypes and favouring
majoritarian tendencies, see: Sara Ahmed, ‘Judicial Complicity with Communal Violence in
India’ (1996) 17(1) Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 320.
It should be noted, however, that since this article is now more than two decades old, it
cannot be taken to reflect the present situation entirely accurately.
For a more recent account (specific to victims of rioting, but talking primarily about the
treatment of Muslims), see ‘‘Victims of Rioting in India are Bashed by Police and Courts,
too’’ (The Economist, 12 March 2020) <https://www.economist.com/asia/2020/03/12/victimsof-rioting-in-india-are-bashed-by-the-police-and-courts-too> accessed 5 October 2021.
Human Rights Watch, Broken System: Dysfunction, Abuse, and Impunity in the Indian Police
(August 2009); Common Cause and Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Status of
Policing in India Report, 2019: Police Adequacy and Working Conditions (2019) 119. In its
section on police attitudes towards particular communities, the study notes, “About half of the
police personnel reported that Muslims are likely to be naturally prone towards committing
violence (‘very much’ and ‘somewhat’ combined).”
See also, S Mandal, ‘Out of Shah Bano’s Shadow: Muslim Women’s Rights and the
Supreme Court’s Triple Talaq Verdict’ (2018) 2(1) Indian Law Review 89.
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the criminalisation justified? What might be the likely repercussions of this for
India’s Muslim minority?
The paper is structured as follows. Part I provides a brief historical overview of Indian personal laws, focussing on the evolution of divorce law. The
Supreme Court verdict of 2017 is discussed in Part II to argue that it invalidated triple talaq for the wrong reasons and to demonstrate that the misplaced
focus of the verdict became the conceptual framework for the criminalisation
of triple talaq. The paper does not seek to demonstrate the different constitutional paths that could have been taken to invalidate triple talaq, nor to offer
arguments on the alternative foundations on which the constitutionality of the
practice could have been challenged. Its purpose is to demonstrate merely that
the judgement’s focus on the ‘arbitrariness’ of triple talaq in view of the tenets
of the Quran and Sunna, instead of the discriminatory nature of the practice,
allowed the government to criminalise the pronouncement of triple talaq per
se without addressing any of the inequalities and structural disadvantages arising from it. Part III analyses the 2019 Act from the perspective of the philosophy of criminal law, drawing on the most prominent and relevant theories of
criminalisation to demonstrate that the invocation of criminal sanction for triple talaq lacks a theoretical foundation, and will, in fact, cause further harm to
Muslim women. Cumulatively, the paper aims to show that the criminalisation
of triple talaq is arbitrary, unjustified, and deeply harmful.

II. INDIAN PERSONAL LAWS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
A. The Birth of Religious Personal Laws
British colonial policy of purported non-interference in the laws and customs of the Indian subcontinent made way for the eventual contraction of the
sphere of traditional customary laws. The codification of secular laws of criminal procedure and evidence, as well as those governing economic transactions,
restricted religious law to essentially personal matters such as marriage and
inheritance.3 The preference of the colonial administrators for text-based, uniform personal law led to the homogenisation of diverse customs, and the subordination of regional or caste-based differences to the dominant discourse of
each religious community.4 As a result, religious identity was privileged over
all others, giving birth to ‘religious’ personal laws.5

3

4

5

R V Williams, Postcolonial Politics and Personal Laws: Colonial Legal Legacies and the
Indian State (OUP India 2006), 69.
M Galanter, ‘The Displacement of Traditional Law in Modern India’ (1968) 24(4) Journal of
Social Issues 65, 69-70.
Williams (n 3) 66.
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In the early 20th century, these homogenised rules of administration were
formally codified. The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act came
into force in 1937 (‘1937 Act’), with the aim of making provisions of the
Shariat (Islamic law drawn from the Quran) applicable to all Muslims in
India.6 The Hindu Code Bill, a uniform Code governing solemnisation and dissolution of marriage, inheritance and succession, guardianship and adoption,
had also begun to be debated afresh in the 1940s.7 The government of independent India, favouring continuity, enacted the Hindu Code Bill in the form
of 4 separate pieces of legislation in 1956.8

B. Divorce Law in Independent India
The framework of religious personal laws inherited from the British colonial government remains in force to this day. Aside from the Special Marriage
Act, 1956, which provides a ‘secular’ (on closer scrutiny, modelled on the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1956)9 framework for marriage and divorce,10 most issues
of family law are determined based on the religion of the parties concerned.
The dominant mode of dissolution of marriages, regardless of the law applied,
is fault-based divorce, granted on proof of certain ‘grounds’ of fault, such as
adultery, cruelty, desertion, impotence, etc. The only alternative is mutual consent divorce, which requires the consent of both partners, and a year-long separation before the application for dissolution can be filed.11 In most cases, the
finalisation of divorce is done by courts of law, even when it is governed by
religious personal law.
However, certain forms of divorce, known as talaq (repudiation) available
to Muslim husbands, allow unilateral, no-fault divorce, finalised outside court
once the conditions of repudiation as laid down in the Shariat are met. One
such condition is a waiting period (the duration of which may vary depending
on the specific form of talaq) meant to encourage reflection, reconsideration
and reconciliation after the pronouncement of talaq.12 This period was considered essential by the Prophet Mohammad because it could act as a check on
capricious divorce by affording an opportunity to revoke the pronouncement
of talaq upon further reflection.13 An exceptional form of unilateral repudiation, however, was talaq-e-biddat, popularly known in India as triple talaq. It

6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13

The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, s 2.
Williams, (n 3) 83.
Williams, (n 3) 96-97.
P Dommaraju, ‘Divorce and Separation in India’ (2016) 42 Population and Development
Review 195, 198.
Special Marriage Act, 1956, Statement of Objects and Reasons.
Dommaraju, (n 9).
Shayara Bano v Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1 [118-119] (Shayara Bano).
ibid [12].
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resulted in instantaneous, irrevocable, no-fault divorce once a Muslim husband
had pronounced it, without any waiting period or scope for revocation.

C. Challenges to Instant Triple Talaq
In Shayara Bano v Union of India,14 (‘Shayara Bano’) a 5-judge bench of
the Supreme Court of India, by a majority of 3:2 declared this form of triple
talaq unconstitutional and void. However, the voices against triple talaq had
been building for a long time before the 5-judge bench finally adjudicated upon
it. Unsurprisingly, this practice had been the subject of litigation for several
decades. While it had not expressly been declared unconstitutional, judges had
frequently held that the Quran did not, in fact, give unbridled, arbitrary power
to enforce instant divorce.15 The position that triple talaq lacks legal sanctity
by virtue of being contrary to the Quran and the Shariat was approved by a
division bench of the Supreme Court of India in Shamim Ara v. State of U.P.,16
which added a further condition that triple talaq, to be valid, needs to have
been appropriately pronounced and communicated to the wife.
Alongside these legal developments, Muslim women’s groups in India
held public hearings and consultations, chronicled the experiences of Muslim
women upon divorce, and even attempted to lobby with the government to
legislatively ban instant triple talaq.17 The grievances of Muslim women
against instant triple talaq are not difficult to appreciate, given the intersecting axes of discrimination and privation to which they are subject. The Global
Multidimensional Poverty Index, 2018 observed that every third Muslim in
India is multi-dimensionally poor,18 implying that 33.33% of Muslims live
with lack of education, poor health and nutrition, unsafe housing, unsanitary
water and living conditions, in addition to having a low income.19 This multi-dimensional poverty when coupled with the widespread gender discrimination that marks Indian society,20 frequently means that Muslim women lack the
14
15

16
17

18

19

20

Shayara Bano (n 12).
A Yusuf Rowther v Sowramma 1970 SCC OnLine Ker 49 : AIR 1971 Ker 261; Jiauddin
Ahmed v Anwara Begum (1981) 1 Gau LR 358; Masroor Ahmed v State (NCT of Delhi) 2007
SCC OnLine Del 1357 : (2008) 103 DRJ 137.
Shamim Ara v State of UP, (2002) 7 SCC 518 (Shamim Ara).
G Panday, ‘Triple Talaq: How Indian Muslim Women Fought, and Won, the Divorce Battle’
(BBC News, 22 August 2017) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-40484276>
accessed 15 April 2020.
Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, Global Multidimensional Poverty Index
(2nd ed, 2018) 24.
ibid 1.
This was also recognised by the Report of the High Level Committee (established by the
Government of India) on the Status of Women in India, Executive Summary (2015) 37.
V Doshi, ‘Why India’s Modern Women Say it’s a “Burden” to be Female’ (The Washington
Post, 12 March 2018) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/03/12/whyindias-modern-women-say-its-a-burden-to-be-female/> (accessed 15 April 2020.
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social and economic capabilities required for ‘self-sufficiency’ in the traditional
sense of being able to secure a living wage in the market.21 Therefore, there is
a significant likelihood that the main source of maintenance and support for a
married Muslim woman (though certainly not for all married Muslim women)
is her husband. Unless such support is continued through judicial intervention,
instant triple talaq exposes Muslim women to significant hardship because neither society, due to its stigmatisation of divorced women,22 nor the state, due to
its poor social security,23 can act as a safety net for them.

III. SHAYARA BANO: THE RIGHT DECISION
FOR THE WRONG REASONS
A. The Judgement
The petitioner in Shayara Bano24 had contended that the practice of triple
talaq was unconstitutional, by virtue of infringing on the fundamental rights
of Muslim women to dignity (Article 21) and equality (Article 14), and on
their fundamental right against discrimination (Article 15) guaranteed by the
Constitution of India, 1950 (‘the Constitution’). While instant triple talaq was,
indeed, declared unconstitutional by the majority, the routes taken to arrive at
the decision were so divergent that, it has rightly been argued, no clear ratio
emerges from the judgement.25 Three of the five judges (Khehar C.J., Nazeer
J., and Joseph J.) held that the practice of triple talaq had not been codified by
the 1937 Act,26 and of these, two judges (Khehar C.J. and Nazeer J.) then went
on to hold that the practice was part of uncodified Muslim Personal law which
could not be tested under the Constitution.27 The third judge (Joseph J.) did
not agree that that the practice was part of uncodified Muslim Personal law.
He reasoned, instead, that the 1937 Act simply made the Shariat the rule of
decision in matters concerning Muslims, and since Shamim Ara28 had already
found instant triple talaq to be contrary to the Shariat (I.B), the practice would

21

22

23

24
25

26
27
28

Less than 10% of Muslim Women are part of the Indian workforce (therefore doing paid
work). See Report of the High-Level Committee (n 19)18.
PR Amato, ‘The Impact of Divorce on Men and Women in India and the United States’ (1994)
25 Journal of Comparative Family Studies 207, 210-211.
A Yadav, ‘How Effective are Social Security and Welfare in India’ (The Hindu, 26 January
2015)
<https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/how-effective-are-social-security-and-welfare-in-india/article6823320.ece> accessed 15 April 2020.
Shayara Bano (n 12).
G Bhatia, ‘The Supreme Court’s Triple Talaq Judgment’ (Indian Constitutional Law and
Philosophy, 22 August 2017) <https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2017/08/22/the-supremecourts-triple-talaq-judgement/> accessed 15April 2020.
Shayara Bano (n 12) [5].
Shayara Bano (n 12) [385-386].
Shamim Ara (n 16).
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also not be protected by the Constitution.29 In that sense, the decision of these
three judges seems to be based more in theology than in the tenets of the
Constitution. While religious freedom was one of the points of contention in
the judgement, its discussion would be outside the scope of this paper.
Instead, I shall focus on the propriety of the reasoning of the remaining
two judges (Nariman J. and Lalit J.), who, along with Joseph J., formed the
majority in the final decision of the case. Nariman and Lalit JJ. concluded that
the 1937 Act codified the practice of instant triple talaq, and therefore, could
be tested on the anvil of fundamental rights.30 They then went on to hold that
since triple talaq was instant, irrevocable and without ‘cause’ (read, fault),
leaving no scope for reconciliation, it allowed Muslim men to ‘capriciously’
break the marital tie. Thus, triple talaq was held to be violative of Article 14
(the right to equality) of the Constitution on the ground that it was disproportionate and excessive, and, in that sense, manifestly arbitrary.31

B. An Opportunity Missed
Manifest arbitrariness, as a standard to assess statutes against the right to
equality under Article 14, emerged with the Supreme Court’s decision in EP
Royappa v State of TN,32 and was reiterated and fleshed out by Maneka Gandhi
v Union of India.33
Nariman J. explained the standard in Shayara Bano34 in the following terms,
“Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature
capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle. Also,
when something is done which is excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary.”35 Manifest arbitrariness may be a valuable
addition to the jurisprudence of Article 14, but its use in Shayara Bano36 raises
a number of questions.
Prima facie, it appears that the ‘manifest arbitrariness’ of instant triple talaq
lay in its nature as an ‘irregular’ or ‘heretical’ form of talaq that is incompatible with the preferred manner laid down in the Quran and the Shariat.37 While
not made explicit in the judgement, a possible rationale, perhaps, was that if
S.2 of the 1937 Act codified the Shariat, it would be manifestly arbitrary to
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Shayara Bano (n 12) [4].
Shayara Bano (n 12) [47].
ibid [104].
EP Royappa v State of TN (1974) 4 SCC 3, [85].
Maneka Gandhi v Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248, [7].
Shayara Bano (n 12).
Shayara Bano (n 12) [101].
ibid.
ibid [102].
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the extent that it codified a practice that was contrary to the Shariat and the
Quran. In my opinion, this rationale was inappropriate because the examination of triple talaq on the anvil of the principles of the Quran or Sunna (a body
of literature that prescribes the social and legal practices of the Muslim community) is essentially a theological exercise, outside the expertise or domain of
a secular, constitutional court. More importantly, as Farrah Ahmed has astutely
argued, the 1937 Act did not in fact codify Islamic religious doctrine, but a
hybrid notion of ‘Anglo-Muhammadan Law’.38 If this is true, then the Court’s
assumption that S.2 of the 1937 Act codified the Shariat is not borne out. It
is unclear, therefore, whether the Court picked the correct frame of reference
to assess whether the 1937 Act was manifestly arbitrary insofar as it codified
triple talaq.
Beyond this, the application of the standard of manifest arbitrariness to triple talaq, discussed in II.A, appears to be little more than a description of the
elements of the practice. That is, triple talaq was found to be manifestly arbitrary because: it is capricious and whimsical (which, in turn, is because it is
instant, without cause, and irrevocable), can be practiced by a Muslim man,
and is finalised without any attempt at, or scope for, reconciliation. In the
absence of any explanation as to why these characteristics make triple talaq
manifestly arbitrary, the application of the standard remains ambiguous.
In taking the route of manifest arbitrariness, therefore, Nariman and Lalit
JJ. chose a somewhat enigmatic and elusive ground to test the constitutionality
of triple talaq. Since triple talaq had been found not to be an essential religious
practice protected by Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution,39 it could have
been tested, instead, on the anvil of the fundamental right against discrimination.40 Article 15(1), of the Constitution prohibits the State from discriminating
against any citizen on certain protected markers, including sex.41 While it is
beyond the scope of this paper to lay out how this would have played out, it is
possible to say that evaluating triple talaq against Article 15 would have been
the more appropriate route to determine its constitutionality. This is for two
reasons. First, it would clearly have been within the mandate and expertise of
the Supreme Court. Secondly, it would have focused the issue on the predicament of Muslim women upon the pronouncement of triple talaq rather than the
abstraction of religious propriety.42
38
39
40

41
42

F Ahmed, Religious Freedom under the Personal Law System (OUP 2015) 28.
Shayara Bano (n 12) [55].
T Khaitan, ‘Inclusive Pluralism or Majoritarian Nationalism: Article 15, Section 377 and Who
We Really Are’ (Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 9 July 2018) <https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2018/07/09/inclusive-pluralism-or-majoritarian-nationalism-article-15-section-377-and-who-we-really-are/> accessed 15 April 2020.
Constitution of India 1950, art 15 (Constitution).
The judgement’s lack of focus on feminist jurisprudence, or the question of gender justice, has
been lamented and critiqued. See:
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C. The ‘Wrong’ of Triple Talaq
It appears from the judgement of the Supreme Court that the ‘wrong’ of triple talaq was coextensive with its very nature: instantaneousness, absence of
fault, irrevocability, and the absence of any scope for reconciliation. In other
words, the problem was framed to be that a Muslim man could divorce his
wife without ‘cause’ (or fault) and without any attempt at reconciliation, That
is -talaq could be affected ‘arbitrarily’ or ‘capriciously’.43 It is my opinion that
this was a mischaracterisation of the problem, caused by focusing on whether
this form of talaq was in tune with the Quran and the Shariat, instead of on
the discrimination experienced by Muslim women consequent to its pronouncement (which could have been dealt with by taking the route of non-discrimination under Art. 15(1), as mentioned in II.B).
The nature of triple talaq as, essentially, an iteration of unilateral no-fault
divorce on demand was not inherently problematic even though it did contradict most of Indian divorce law and policy which favours fault-based divorce
finalised in a Court of law (I.B). I contend that the problem arose from the
manner in which this form of talaq was practised.44 For one, it was an option
available only to men, meaning that its consequences only befell Muslim
women. It is worth noting that Muslim personal law does provide for a

method of divorce at the instance of the wife, called khula. The formulation
of khula, however, is that the wife pays consideration to the husband (such
as the relinquishment of her dower or other arrangement) for him to release
her from the marriage tie, or to repudiate her. Moreover, a wife’s offer of
khula may be rejected by the husband,45 and in that sense, Muslim women
do not have an equivalent right to unilateral, no fault-divorce. The formulation of khula, however, is that the wife pays consideration to the husband (such
as the relinquishment of her dower or other arrangement) for him to release
her from the marriage tie, or to repudiate her.46 However, the strengthening of
this right to seek divorce has never been at the forefront of Muslim’s women’s

43
44

45

46

Ratna Kapur, ‘Gender and the “Faith” in Law: Equality, Secularism, and the Rise of the
Hindu Nation’ (2020) 35(3) Journal of Law and Religion 407, 417-419.
RatnaKapur, ‘Triple Talaq Verdict: Wherein Lies the Much Hailed Victory?’ (The Wire, 28
August 2017) <https://thewire.in/gender/triple-talaq-verdict-wherein-lies-the-much-hailed-victory> accessed 5 October 2021.
Shayara Bano (n 12) [104].
S Chaudhary and S Kale, ‘The Right to Love and the Right to Leave- Recognising Autonomy
through Unilateral No-Fault Divorce’ (Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 6 April
2020) <https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2020/04/06/guest-post-the-right-to-love-and-theright-to-leave-recognising-autonomy-through-unilateral-no-fault-divorce/> accessed 15 April
2020.
Submissions of the Amicus Curiae, Mr Salman Khurshid in Shayara Bano [67-68] <https://
scobserver-production.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/case_document/document_upload/643/W.S._
by_Salman_Khurshid__Amicus_Curiae_.pdf> accessed 5 October 2021).
Asaf AA Fyzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law (3rd ed, 1964), 156.
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demands regarding divorce law. The report of the National Commission for
Women, Voice of the Voiceless (2000),47 which was based on the testimony of
Muslim women who spoke at public hearings across the country, describes and
explains the situation succinctly,
Muslim women too have the right to seek dissolution of marriage under the system of khula, but this right is very rarely
invoked for the simple reason that her seeking divorce would
completely deprive her of whatever she may get from her
husband, most importantly, a place to live. This in itself is
a great disincentive. It is significant that during the Public
Hearings not a single woman raised the question of khula,
its usefulness or the need to improve upon it and the right of
women to seek it. The deponents only expressed their anguish
at the tyranny of the triple talaq, which was the single most
potent cause of their devastation.
Secondly, while all forms of talaq under Muslim personal law are finalised
privately (as between the husband and the wife, without the involvement of the
Court), triple talaq in particular would frequently be pronounced over the telephone, over text messages, or over Skype or Facebook. This, in combination
with the fact that triple talaq can be pronounced and finalised at once (without
a waiting period or scope for reconciliation), meant that talaq pronounced in a
fit of rage or a drunken stupor could become irrevocably final. Furthermore,
once triple talaq had been pronounced, there was no scope for revocation. This
meant that if the husband changed his mind and decided to take his (divorced)
wife back, she would have to go through the practice of nikah halala (marriage
with another man, and repudiation by him) before she could remarry the first
husband. This combination of circumstances (which, I stress, were not only
aided by the nature of triple talaq but arose because it had been adapted, using
technology and the lenience and patriarchal orthodoxy of the All India Muslim
Personal Law Board, to maximise the dominance and convenience of men) was
experienced by Muslim women as an assault on their dignity because of the
constant threat and fear of triple talaq.48
This threat and fear is underlined and exacerbated by the third reason why
the practice of triple talaq was especially problematic for women: the fact that
Muslim Personal Law laid down no obligation on the husband for maintenance

47

48

Syeda Saiyidain Hameed, The National Commission for Women (India), Voice of the
Voiceless: Status of Muslim Women in India (Pt 2, 2000) Ch 3.
Writ Petition submitted by the petitioner, Shayara Bano in Shayara Bano, [7-8] <https://scobserver-production.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/case_document/document_upload/106/ShayaraBano-Writ-Petition-FINAL-VERSION.pdf> accessed 5 October 2021.
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(except payment of dower),49 meant that the divorced woman was left without
any safeguards against the financial hardships that accompanied being removed
from her matrimonial home (I.C), possibly with children to care for.50
The only option available to a divorced Muslim woman, in these circumstances, is to claim maintenance under S. 125, Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (Cr.P.C.), which empowers a Magistrate to order a monthly allowance
upon proof of neglect or refusal to maintain on the part of the man.51 However,
this would require her to petition the Magistrate’s Court and establish neglect
or refusal. This pre-supposes a great deal of social and economic capital as
well as a certain degree of legal awareness and access. As discussed in I.C, the
intersectional disadvantage of belonging to a multi-dimensionally poor minority, and pervasive gender discrimination and violence, means that most Muslim
women are not financially independent. They are unlikely, then, to possess
such social and economic capital, or have the information or support required
to access legal remedies. Depending on the length of the marriage, moreover,
the divorced woman may have spent a vast majority of her life taking care of
the home and raising children.52 Alternatively, when talaq is pronounced in
the early years of marriage, the divorced woman may have young children for
whose care she would be primarily responsible, given the gendered patterns of
child-rearing in India.53 These circumstances, would severely limit her employment options. It is no wonder, then, that divorced Indian women who do enter
the workforce are disproportionately clustered in relatively poorly-paid employment with few benefits and little security.54
Therefore, privation is a likely consequence of triple talaq for Muslim
women. This is exacerbated by the isolation that accompanies the loss of
family life, relatively poor chances of remarriage,55 and the absence of community support that follows the stigmatisation of divorced women.56 While
nothing can replace the family and community as anchors of individual identity and sources of affection and connection with other human beings, it is
49
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possible for the State to at least provide financial support to women who have
been divorced, or have child-care responsibilities. In England and Wales, for
instance, a person raising a child under the age of 16, or a child under the age
of 20 if they remain in approved education or training, can claim child benefit at a fixed weekly rate.57 A variation of this kind of child benefit is paid by
a number of other countries such as Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany,
France, Luxemburg, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands.58
The situation in India, however, is marked by the absence of social security
provided by the State, leaving women without a safety net.59 Not only does
this mean that women’s quality of life (both emotional and material) decreases,
their capacity to care for and raise their children is also impacted.
From the discussion in the previous paragraphs, it is clear that triple talaq
could not affect men in the same way, or to the same degree, that it affected
women, for a number of reasons. The wrong of triple talaq, therefore, would
more appropriately be framed as the excessive and disproportionate impact it
had on women compared to men, instead of its inherent nature as instantaneous, no-fault, or unilateral, but the excessive and disproportionate impact it had
on women compared to men.60 While this disproportionate impact, for the most
part a consequence of wider gender inequalities, is not special to triple talaq
and is likely to follow from any form of divorce, regardless of the religion of
the parties,61 it is important to view it in conjunction with the other reasons
(discussed above) which make the practice triple talaq particularly problematic
for women. Had the Supreme Court taken the Article 15 route to determine the
constitutionality of the practice, this ‘wrong’ of triple talaq could have been
identified and given primacy over the incompatibility of the practice with the
Quran and the Shariat.
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D. Misidentified Wrongs as the Driver of Criminalisation
The Supreme Court’s judgement in Shayara Bano, and in particular, its misidentification of the ‘wrong’ of triple talaq has had consequences more severe
than the loss of an opportunity to highlight and engage with the discrimination
wrought by the practice. It has become the driver of misguided State action.
The minority judgement of Khehar and Nazeer JJ., while refusing to declare
the practice unconstitutional, had directed ‘the Union of India to consider
appropriate legislation with reference to triple talaq’.62 This direction lent moral
authority to a Hindu-nationalist party’s attempt to cast themselves as protectors
of Muslim women and legislate upon the practice of a minority community.63
Since the ‘wrong’ of triple talaq, according to the Supreme Court, was located
in its very nature and characteristics, the State sought to “prohibit divorce by
pronouncing talaq”64 through the 2019 Act.
Much like the judgement that inspired it, the 2019 Act subordinates the
discriminatory impact of triple talaq, its ‘wrongs’ as identified in II.C, to the
pronouncement of triple talaq itself. While the 2019 Act does purport to “protect the rights of Muslim women”,65 its provisions do little to substantiate that
claim. S. 5 of the Act, for instance, provides for a ‘subsistence allowance’, but
in fact merely reiterates the remedy already available in S. 125, Cr.P.C, which
was minimal to begin with.66 As discussed in II.C, such a remedy pre-supposes
a degree of independence, awareness, power, and financial capability that is
not the privilege of most Muslim women consequent to repudiation. Moreover,
while S. 5 of the 2019 Act does not explicitly make the responsibility for maintenance contingent on the capacity to pay unlike S. 125, Cr.P.C., such a contingency would necessarily be implicit in any order for maintenance. It is plainly
impossible for a person to pay money that she does not have. Similarly, in
providing that upon the pronouncement of triple talaq Muslim women would
be “entitled to custody of her minor children”,67 the 2019 Act sidelines the
62
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2019 Act, s 6.
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principle of ‘best interest of the child’, which would otherwise have determined
custody.68 In a context where her former husband is in custody or in prison,
and therefore unable to pay (sufficient) maintenance, such an immutable provision reword to could serve potentially to increase her burden.
By taking the route of criminalisation instead of welfare legislation, the
State, like the Supreme Court, has failed to address the real ‘wrong’ of triple
talaq. At present, it is unclear what the prohibition and criminalisation of the
pronouncement of triple talaq is meant to achieve, other than discouraging the
use of this mode of repudiation (see III. B). It might be argued that the implicit
purpose is to discourage divorce in general. If so, the legislation is doomed
to fail on two counts. First, because as family law scholars and policy-makers increasingly contend,69 laws which seek to prolong marriages where one or
both parties want to leave the marriage only constrain individual autonomy and
intensify conflict within the relationship.70 Secondly, as rightly argued by the
Attorney General of India,71 other forms of unilateral, no-fault divorce available to Muslim men, such as talaq-i-ahsan and talaq-i-hasan,72 though finalised
after a waiting period, would still bring the marriage to an end without ‘cause’.
Increasing the time taken to finalise divorce would not prevent divorce.73 It
would be far more prudent, therefore, to focus on addressing the vulnerabilities
of Muslim women upon talaq.
The judgement of the Supreme Court, in declaring triple talaq void, had
already stripped it of its ability to affect divorce. The focus of the government,
then, should have been on addressing the financial and material vulnerabilities
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judgement acknowledged the futility of enforcing marital fidelity and commitment through
criminal sanction for default. While the case was concerned with adultery, it is clear that the
principle applies to the criminalisation of triple talaq as well. Just as punishment is unlikely
to establish commitment (either through deterrence, or sanction) in cases of infidelity, so it is
that punishing one form of divorce is a poor and likely ineffective way to ensure that the couple stays together. [64, 211, 281.1-281.4].
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of Muslim women on divorce through welfare legislation. What the government has done, instead, is criminalise the pronouncement of triple talaq.

IV. CRIMINALISATION OF TRIPLE
TALAQ: UNJUSTIFIED, EXCESSIVE
AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE
At the broadest level, legal ‘regulation’ of any conduct may be beholden to
justification because of its likely effect on the rights of individuals.74 An iteration of this idea is the test of the constitutionality of legislations in India.75
Criminal law deserves scrutiny more than any other form of legal regulation
because of the wide-ranging powers granted to the State to ‘deal with’ conduct
defined as ‘criminal’. These powers range from the coercive force deployed by
the police to prevent offences76 to the significantly punitive consequences that
follow conviction.77 Michael Moore justifies a special focus on the limits of
criminal law on the ground that its coercive nature ‘threatens to restrain all
citizens subject to it’, and in that sense, takes away their liberty.78
Even disconnected from these powers and consequences, criminal law calls
for justification because of its very nature as the conveyor of social opprobrium. For some scholars, in fact, this precisely sets criminal sanction apart.79
H.M. Hart, for instance, observed, “What distinguishes a criminal from a civil
sanction and all that distinguishes it, it is ventured, is the judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition”.80 Joel
Feinberg nuanced this position, stating that the punitive consequences of criminal actions, such as imprisonment and its physical hardships and privations, are
expressive of social condemnation, “It would be more accurate in many cases
to say that the unpleasant treatment itself expresses the condemnation, and that
this expressive aspect of his incarceration is precisely the element by reason
of which it is properly characterized as punishment and not mere penalty.”81
Even Antony Duff characterises criminal law, and in particular the criminal
74
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justice process, as a system through which citizens are called to account for
their wrongdoing.82
The nature of criminal law, and the extent and impact of criminal sanction are strong reasons to limit the scope of criminalisation, for these powers and sanctions, when deployed inappropriately, infringe on the cherished
values of individual liberty, privacy, and the rule of law.83 The question then
arises, when is the use of criminal law justified? A universally agreed upon
answer, broadly applicable to the exhaustive range of human conduct has yet
to be made,84 but fortunately, that is not the mandate of this paper. The Indian
Parliament’s decision to criminalise the pronouncement of triple talaq after it
had been rendered void and powerless by the decision of the Supreme Court
begs the question- what purpose was sought to be achieved by Parliament and
does it justify the heavy hand of criminal law? Parliamentary debates on the
2019 Act,85 saw repeated questions and objections on the religious motivations behind the legislation, its effect on Muslim women, and the (im)propriety of criminalising what ought to remain a civil issue. Other than deterrence
(on which, see III.B), however, the principles or motivations underlying the
criminalisation were never discussed. Therefore, in the absence of a clear mandate for legislation from the Parliament, I shall evaluate the criminalisation of
triple talaq against a cross-section of principles or standards of criminalisation,
to determine whether there is any justification for it.

A. 2019 Act: Criminalisation without Justification
S. 3, 2019 Act declares that the pronouncement of triple talaq by a Muslim
man upon his wife shall be void and ‘illegal.’ S. 4 of the 2019 Act, then provides: “Any Muslim husband who pronounces talaq referred to in section
3 upon his wife shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.”86 I shall argue that the
Legislature’s choice to criminalise triple talaq, stripped of its power to effect
divorce by the judgement of the Supreme Court,87 cannot appropriately be justified against any of the standard principles of criminalisation.
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1. The ‘Harm’ Principle(s) and Triple Talaq
The ‘harm’ principle was originally articulated by John Stuart Mill, who
argued, “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm
to others.”88 This principle has been rearticulated in different forms, leading
James Edwards to argue that there is not one, but several harm principles.89
Feinberg’s version of the principle, for instance, states that the possible prevention of harm is a good reason to criminalise conduct,90 although it is neither a justification, nor a sufficient reason, for criminalisation. For Feinberg, in
contrast to Mill, the prevention of harm is not the only good reason for the
criminalisation of conduct, but one of many.91 It is, moreover, a positive reason for criminalisation, and not merely a negative constraint on it. Whatever
its form, the harm principle, as rightly argued by Andreas von Hirsch and
Andrew Simester, is essentially consequentialist.92 Its meaning and application
are entirely dependent on the established harmfulness of the conduct being
criminalised.
In the Feinbergian sense, if the harm principle is to provide a reason (even
if not the reason) for the criminalisation of triple talaq, it must be shown that
triple talaq has a harmful effect on someone. This view also emerges from
the decision of the Supreme Court of India in Navtej Johar v. Union of India93
where Chandrachud J. held that there was no basis for criminalising the acts
covered by S. 377, IPC94 when performed by consenting adults because they
do not harm anyone, nor do they pose a risk to society. It is painfully clear,
however, that since triple talaq can no longer repudiate a marriage after being
declared void by the Supreme Court, its pronouncement would have no effectharmful or otherwise.
Jonathan Herring aptly described the ‘harm’ principle as a gatekeeper of
criminalisation, implying that its utility lay more in determining which conduct
88
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is unworthy of criminalisation by virtue of being ‘harmless’.95 I agree with
this characterisation, and propose that triple talaq, being harmless, is unfit for
criminalisation.
It might, however, be argued that despite being void, triple talaq can technically still cause ‘harm’, not because it repudiates a marriage, but because of
its association with patterns of ostracisation, material deprivation and violence.
There is little doubt that the background harms of divorce need to be
acknowledged. However, the 2019 Act, which simply makes it a criminal
offence to pronounce triple talaq, is not the appropriate solution, because the
pronouncement itself is not the true cause of the trauma. The real reason for
the likely trauma is the underlying vulnerability of Muslim women, which is
not addressed by the 2019 Act in any meaningful way (II.D). The acts of physical and emotional violence that often accompany triple talaq,96 moreover, are
forms of domestic abuse, already covered by The Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005.97
Notwithstanding this, it might be argued that triple talaq is still ‘harmful’
because it may cause severe mental trauma to a Muslim woman by conveying
the husband’s intent to leave the wife. Even if she knows that no divorce can
legally take place on the mere pronouncement of triple talaq, or that she has
remedies to associated domestic abuse, the news of impending repudiation may
cause distress.
However, is triple talaq the only kind of pronouncement that could cause
such harm? I am inclined to say no. The same effect would be caused by a
number of other statements which convey the same intent, including the pronouncement of other forms of talaq. In fact, other statements, such as, “Get out
of my house” or “Go back to your parents’ house” may cause even more distress, by signalling not only the end of the marriage but the additional loss of
the shared matrimonial home. The specific focus of the 2019 Act on the words,
“talaq talaq talaq”, is, therefore, arbitrary.98 The only reason triple talaq was
distinct from other distressing exclamations was because it could instantaneously and irrevocably repudiate a marriage. Having lost this power because of
the 2017 judgement, triple talaq has also lost its uniqueness. There is no longer
95
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a justification for singling it out and this, in turn makes its criminalisation
arbitrary.
Moreover, as previously discussed, the existence of a harmful effect may be
a gateway to criminalisation, but it is by no means a sufficient ground for it.
Therefore, even if the distressing effect of triple talaq is accepted as a gateway
‘harm’, the criminalisation of triple talaq would have to fulfil certain other criteria, such as ‘wrongfulness’ or ‘blameworthiness’ to be justified.99

2. Criminal Law and the Enforcement of Morality
The criminalisation of triple talaq may be justified on the ground that criminal law is a means of enforcing some form of morality- the public morality
of Patrick Devlin, the true or positive morality espoused by Moore, the public wrong standard theorised by Duff, or the constitutionalism standard of
Malcolm Thorburn, especially as constitutional morality in India.

a) Public morality
Lord Devlin asserted that society has a right to protect, through criminal
law, aspects of private morality without which the survival of society would
be threatened. Such aspects would include acts viewed as profoundly disgusting by members of society. He asserted that the separation of crime and sin
is futile because all ‘social norms’ that the criminal law seeks to uphold, are
drawn from religious morality.100 However, as H.L.A. Hart argued in response,
it is unclear whether the social norms of society are, in fact, drawn from religious or public morality, or that the acceptance of certain norms as the ‘positive’ morality of a society should, indeed, be the reason they are enforced
through criminal law.101
In any case, it is unclear whether the majority community in India finds
the practice of triple talaq so intensely immoral as to threaten the survival of
society. This is especially because the practice does not affect the society as
such, but only Muslim women. However, even if it is assumed that such a public morality existed, how would it be gauged? James Fitzjames Stephen, when
debating Mill’s ‘harm principle’, argued that in a legal system that is ‘good’,
the legislature may enact a ‘morally intolerant’ legislation.102 If it is criminal
legislation, such moral intolerance would “gratify the feeling of hatred… which
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the contemplation of such conduct excites in healthily constituted minds”.103
Grounded on this, an argument might be made to the effect that a properly
elected legislature may be the custodian of public morality, and in that role,
seek retribution through criminal sanction. However, such an argument would
not even satisfy Stephen’s own conditions. The ‘hatred’ or ‘vengeance’ of
which he spoke was not directed towards people or communities, but towards
the act, or conduct in question. And there is nothing to suggest that such a
feeling of hatred exists towards triple talaq per se. Besides, it has been argued
that Stephen was a critical legal moralist, meaning that he appealed not only to
public morality but to a more universal morality not given to majoritarian tendencies.104 Most importantly, however, the actions of the legislature, even when
correct in form, cannot serve as the moral justification for criminalisation. Not
only would it be a self-fulfilling principle, but also its consequences in this
instance, would be too perverse to justify. It would result in the application of
majoritarian morality, through a legislature openly hostile to minorities,105 to
justify the criminalisation of a legislation that exclusively governs a minority
community in a society constitutionally committed to secular values.106 For
these reasons, the enforcement of morals, in the manner proposed by Devlin or
Stephen, cannot serve as an appropriate ground to justify the criminalisation of
triple talaq.

b) Public wrong
Since Devlin, legal moralism has seen considerable revision, and is now
considered one of the most acceptable theories of criminalisation, though it is
not without its problems.107 Moore, for example, has argued that the retributivist punishment of criminal law must be limited to those who are culpable (by intent) for a moral wrongdoing, recognised by law.108 Unlike Devlin,
Moore does not propose that criminal law enforce the morality of the public
or of the majority, but that it enforce “morality as such”,109 referring to moral
norms “telling us what we are obligated to do or not to do.”110 While Moore
proposes positive retribution for the transgression of moral norms through
criminal sanction, Duff offers a negative constraint on criminalisation- that
conduct which is not ‘wrongful’ may not be criminalised.111 He presents a more
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workable standard for criminalisation- ‘public wrongs’. The conduct, to be worthy of criminalisation, must be ‘wrongful’ in the sense of a transgression of
social norms substantial enough to merit coercive State action.112 This largely
overlaps with the category of offences termed mala in se (wrong in itself), and
may best be defined as actions which “violate a value upon which the civic
enterprise depends, and display a lack of the respect and concern that all citizens owe to each other as fellow citizens.”113 The conduct must be more than
just a private wrong that can be dealt with through civil law. This does not
automatically exclude interpersonal conduct from the ambit of criminal law, as
‘public’ and ‘private’ are not defined by the location of the conduct, or even
the relationship of the parties.114 Duff and Sandra Marshall argued that wrongs
would be ‘public’ when they damage important legal rights, which the State
has an interest in upholding.115 Grant Lamond, similarly, argued that the focus
of criminal law should be the behaviour which the community would have
an interest in punishing.116 While the two arguments seem to be approaching
the subject from different starting points,117 conceptually, they converge. Both
approaches define ‘public’ in terms of the role of Criminal law in protecting
rights or matters that concern the community at large because they are essential to preserving and maintaining the good of the community and its members, and indeed, in maintaining the “civil order” of the polity.118 It is to this
standard that, in my opinion, Chandrachud J. referred when speaking of conduct that poses a “threat to the stability and security of society”.119
Does the pronouncement of triple talaq meet these criteria? I believe that
it does not, even if it is assumed that its pronouncement had not already been
declared void. Drawing from the discussion in II.C and II.D, triple talaq may
be considered a ‘wrong’ in two senses: first, in consonance with the wrong
identified by the Supreme Court and the 2019 Act- its very nature and character, its incompatibility with the preferred form of talaq in the Quran and the
Shariat; or second, its impact, or the devastating consequences it may have for
the repudiated woman. If, as it seems from the Preamble of the 2019 Act,120
the Legislature sought to criminalise the first ‘wrong’, the criminalisation of
triple talaq is entirely baseless. I have previously argued (II.C and II.D) that,
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assessed in light of the secular principles of the Constitution of India, there
is nothing inherently wrong with triple talaq. Any perceived wrong is not of
a nature that would ‘violate a value upon which the civic exercise depends’,
and in that sense is private, rather than public. Likewise, there is nothing in
the Constitution of India to suggest that a form or method of divorce must
be based on fault or mutual consent or must provide scope for reconciliation.
However, even if this were the constitutionally (instead of Quranically) preferred form of divorce, non-compliance would not amount to a transgression
grave enough to merit coercive, liberty-limiting action through criminal law.
It would, at best, be liable to redressal in civil or constitutional law, as it was
in Shayara Bano.121 This was also one of the arguments made by opposition
parties when the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill, 2019
was being debated in the Legislature.122
On the other hand, if the ‘wrong’ sought to be addressed was the impact
of triple talaq, criminalisation was an unjustified and inappropriate policy choice because the pronouncement of triple talaq can no longer dissolve
a marriage and give rise to the potentially harmful consequences of divorce
(III.A.1). Moreover, even if such consequences did ensue, criminalisation
would be unwarranted. Triple talaq by its nature does not qualify the standard
of a wrong that deserves public censorship and punitively enforced accountability.123 Criminalisation of the practice of triple talaq (which, I am assuming
for the moment, is not void), would also not prevent a Muslim man from repudiating his wife without any obligation to support her or her children. He could
still unilaterally, and without fault, repudiate her through other forms of talaq.
Furthermore, deterring a Muslim man from practising triple talaq would not
deter him from leaving his wife, which, in fact, would be the cause of her vulnerability.124 The appropriate way to address this potential ‘wrong’ (II.D) would
be by imposing maintenance obligations on Muslim husbands automatically
upon divorce, or/and by providing a State-sponsored safety net which would
allow women to meet their financial and material needs, as well as those of
their children, whether or not their husbands supported them.
Triple talaq, therefore, does not meet the standard of moral culpability
or ‘wrongfulness’ worthy of criminal sanction. It would also not qualify the
higher standard of a ‘public wrong’ that must be addressed through criminal
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law to further the overall ‘good’ of the community. The criminalisation of triple talaq cannot, then, be justified against the ‘public wrong’ standard.

c) Constitutional morality:
The use of ‘morality’ to justify criminalisation must be contextualised
through the development of the standard of ‘constitutional morality’ by the
Supreme Court of India. Its conclusive decision in Navtej Singh Johar v Union
of India,125 which decriminalised sexual acts ‘against the order of nature’,
firmly established the principle that the infringement of fundamental rights in
India (including through criminalisation) must be justified against the standard of Constitutional morality and not public morality.126 The judgement developed constitutional morality in specific contrast to public morality. The concept
draws from the guarantee of minimum rights and the recognition of individual
autonomy, privacy, and dignity.127 Meant to enforce the transformative vision of
the Constitution, such morality overrides majoritarian concerns.128
To some extent, this standard overlaps with the Constitutional limits to
criminal law identified by Thorburn, although in the Indian context, its application has been broader, covering not just criminal law but any infringement of fundamental rights. He argues that a liberal Constitution seeks to
set up a structure within which individuals may pursue their self-determined
goals. In such a system, the criminal law punishes those who seek to subvert
“law’s neutral ordering with their own preferred arrangements.” The ‘offence’
is against the system of equality and freedom rather than an individual.129
Constitutional morality is also concerned with values that form the essence of
the Constitution, of the order that it seeks to create for the citizens governed by
it. It seeks to punish acts that would threaten such an order, and in that sense,
occupies the same conceptual terrain.
Assessed on the anvil on Constitutional morality, triple talaq, when stripped
of its power to repudiate marriage, does not violate any fundamental right or
principle of the Constitution of India, or the order that it seeks to create. While
it could still cause divorce, triple talaq was discriminatory, but even this, by
itself, would not be a sufficient ground to criminalise the practice, because it
did not threaten the Constitutional order. It went against one of the principles
of the Constitution (equality) and could effectively have been remedied (as
125
126

127
128
129

Navtej Johar (n 83).
Navtej Johar (n 83) [606, 607] It should be noted that constitutional morality has expressly
been used by Courts only in decriminalising conduct. It is unclear, therefore, whether it is
even something that can or ought to be enforced through criminal law.
Navtej Johar (n 83) [600].
Navtej Johar (n 83) [599].
Thorburn (n 109) 100.

128

SOCIO-LEGAL REVIEW

VOL. 17

it was, albeit for different reasons) by declaring it unconstitutional and void.
Therefore, the criminalisation of triple talaq through the 2019 Act cannot be
justified as appropriate enforcement of Constitutional morality through criminal law.

3. Triple Talaq as Mala Prohibita
It has been demonstrated in the foregoing sections that triple talaq does
not qualify the threshold of moral blameworthiness or wrongfulness necessary for criminalisation, whatever moral lens one might adopt. In other words,
the criminalisation of triple talaq cannot be justified as a malum in se type
offence. Offences that are not mala in se (III.A.2) may be mala prohibita (conduct which is not wrongful without or independent of the law).130 Mala prohibita offences have been justified as exceptions to, or weaker forms of moral
restraints on the power of the state to criminalise conduct. For instance, Victor
Tadros’ utilitarian theory claimed that conduct which is not inherently wrong
may legitimately be criminalised if such criminalisation “prevents a great deal
of harm, and does not cause much harm.”131 This claim has been accepted
by legal moralists such as Duff as a ‘weak constraint’ on criminalisation,132
in that sense, justifying in principle the existence of malum prohibitum type
offences.133 However, this acceptance is subject to the condition that there be
‘good reasons’ for the criminalisation of such conduct, for the criminalisation
itself does not make it morally ‘wrong’.134 Tadros’ own reservations about the
vagueness of terms such as ‘harm’,135 which undoubtedly extend also to ‘good
reasons’, and the difficulties of empirically establishing such a balance,136 I
believe, makes the application of this preventive theory highly subjective. The
examples used by Tadros, such as preventing the destruction of the world, or
stoppage of desperately needed foreign aid, set up scenarios in which even the
strictest legal moralist would concede that “where utilitarian stakes are sufficiently high, any principle may be infringed.”137
For the purposes of this paper, then, the question is whether the
criminalisation of triple talaq meets such high utilitarian stakes. I believe it
does not. In fact, it has no utilitarian value whatsoever. As discussed in III.A.1,
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a consequentialist assessment of triple talaq shows that it has no effect that can
be identified as unique or particularly harmful, and especially not the monumental effect that Tadros envisages for mala prohibita offences. In fact, the
criminalisation of triple talaq would, as I shall show in III.B., cause active
harm, tilting the scales further against criminalisation.
A less onerous standard for creating mala prohibita offences was offered
by Susan Dimock from a contractarian perspective. She argues that the social
contract offers new possibilities of cooperation and interaction which can contribute to human flourishing. Therefore, “institutions which serve a common
good, and regulations that coordinate conduct in mutually beneficial ways can
be reinforced using criminal laws.”138 Like the utilitarian view discussed above,
the contractarian perspective also seeks to justify such offences for their preventive value, which would help maintain the legitimate expectations of parties
involved in any such cooperative exercise.139
Does the criminalisation of triple talaq serve such a purpose? It could be
argued that if marriage is an iteration of an exercise in social cooperation that
contributes to human flourishing (I accept, arguendo, that it can be), then the
arbitrary and unilateral ending of marriage without fault, ought to be deterred.
However, such an argument does not withstand deeper scrutiny. For one, the
premise that a practise ought to be deterred does not lead to the conclusion
that the deterrence should be achieved through criminal law.140 Secondly, and
more particularly, the contractarian theory of criminalisation requires a law
that would have been agreed upon ex-ante by every contracting individual on
the belief that it would result in a net benefit to them.141 In the absence of an
inherent wrongfulness standard, mala prohibita offences must consider the regulatory background within which they were adopted. One important aspect of
this consideration is that the benefits and burdens of the offence must be (and
must be seen to be) distributed fairly,142 failing which it cannot reasonably be
assumed that each contracting individual would have agreed to the particular
proscription. Even if it is assumed that the purpose of the criminalisation of
triple talaq would lead to stabilising expectations from marriage, it would do
so only with respect to Muslim marriages, as affected by talaq-i-biddat, while
allowing other forms of destabilising conduct, such as desertion143 or cheating
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unaddressed. This, in addition to the fact that the law would specifically target
Muslim men, strongly indicates that the benefits and burdens of the offence are
not equally distributed. Therefore, even from a contractarian perspective, the
criminalisation of triple talaq cannot be justified as mala prohibita.

B. Excessive and Counterproductive use of Criminalisation
I have argued in III.A. that the criminalisation of triple talaq in the 2019
Act lacks theoretical rationale and justification. In this section, I shall demonstrate that the 2019 Act, in addition, is disproportionate in its sentencing, gives
excessive coercive powers to the State, and would only cause further harm to
Muslim women.
The discussion on criminalisation in III.A was premised on the ground that
criminal law requires special justification because of the very nature of criminal sanction, and because regulation of criminal conduct involves the use of
coercive powers of prevention and punishment which threaten the liberty of the
individual. The principle of proportionality of punishment- that the sentence
prescribed for an offence should be legitimately imposed,144 and should reflect
the gravity of the offence- is a foundational requirement of ‘fairness’ in the
application of criminal sanction.145 The principle draws from Bentham’s utilitarian argument that all punishment is inherently evil, and can be justified only
if it excludes some greater evil.146
Without entering the philosophical debate on punishment, I argue that the
sentence for triple talaq (imprisonment for upto 3 years and fine)147 is excessively harsh, both objectively and relatively. It is objectively excessive because
there is no real ‘wrong’ that is being punished (III.A.2). It is subjectively
excessive because other, arguably graver, offences carry smaller sentences.
Consider, for instance, that the offence of rioting, which is demonstrably a public wrong, being violent and disruptive, and likely to cause both bodily and
property damage, is punishable by imprisonment for upto 2 years or fine or
both.148 Similarly, causing death by negligence is punishable by imprisonment
for upto 2 years,149 even though it literally results in the loss of life. Therefore,
there does not appear to be any determining principle behind the punishment
prescribed for pronouncing triple talaq. In light of the anti-Muslim bias of the
144
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Hindu-nationalist party in power (see below), the rationale behind such excessive sentencing becomes even more suspect.
Yet another sense in which the 2019 Act gives disproportionate coercive
powers to the State is that the pronouncement of triple talaq is a cognizable
and non-bailable offence,150 meaning that the police may arrest a Muslim man
for the ‘offence’ of pronouncing triple talaq, without a warrant.151 Such power
may be exercised, moreover, not just on the information given by a Muslim
woman herself, but ‘by any person related to her by blood or marriage.’152
Having been arrested, furthermore, a Muslim man cannot automatically be
released on bail. He must surrender his liberty while he applies for bail, produces sureties and waits for the Magistrate to hear his wife and determine
whether there are reasonable grounds to release him on bail.153
It might be argued that the extent of coercive powers given to the State can
be justified in terms of the likely deterrent effect of the sentence. The High
Court of Delhi in Nadeem Khan v Union of India,154 recently held that merely
because triple talaq was declared to be illegal and void, does not mean that
the Parliament could not have criminalised it. The division bench observed that
the purpose of criminalisation was to deter the practice. The question, however, ought not to be whether the Parliament could have criminalised it, but
whether it should have done so. If the rationale of the High Court is accepted,
then Indian jurisprudence on criminalisation would amount to nothing more
than ‘the Parliament wants to prevent this conduct’. As is obvious, this would
be a circular and self-fulfilling principle of criminalisation. Surely, in a democratic society that values individual liberty, it is important to ask why the
Parliament wants to prevent the target conduct, and whether it is legitimate
for the Parliament to do so through the coercive functions of criminal law. In
other words, is deterrence or prevention (assuming it can be achieved) a good
enough reason to criminalise conduct? Edwards and Simester, speaking of the
moral force of preventive laws, argue that prevention, like harm, is a good reason for criminalisation. However, the conduct being prevented must, in some
sense be wrongful,155 which, as previously demonstrated, is not the case with
triple talaq (III.A.2 and III.A.3). The criminalisation of conduct that is not
demonstrably wrongful can, in fact, lead to the criminal law losing its moral
force,156 and should be avoided.
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Therefore, deterrence does not in itself justify criminalisation. Even if it is
assumed that coercive sanction and severe punishment could deter behaviour,
I argue that the deterrence of the pronouncement of triple talaq would make
no difference to the predicament of Muslim women. Muslim men could still
divorce their wives irrevocably, unilaterally and without fault, through other
forms of talaq, and thereby end the marriage without any obligation to support
her and her children (III.A.2).
If anything, the 2019 Act, purportedly enacted to ‘protect the rights of
Muslim women’, is likely to cause further harm by criminalising triple talaq.
One obvious consequence of incarcerating a Muslim man for pronouncing triple talaq is that his capacity to remain gainfully employed, and thereby pay
for the maintenance of his wife and children, is severely damaged, if not
destroyed. In the absence of a State-sponsored safety net, this exacerbates the
predicament of the repudiated Muslim woman and her children.
Another, more serious, consequence of this criminalisation is that it exposes
an already vulnerable minority to further coercive control by the State.
Muslims have always been targeted in the enforcement of anti-terror legislations,157 and have more recently been caught in the net of anti-cow slaughter
legislation which affects them disproportionately due to their food and livelihood choices.158 There is, in addition, a concerted effort to prevent conversions
to Islam or the immigration of Muslims into India. The relatively wide-spread
conspiratorial narrative of ‘love-jihad’ which suggests that there is an organised movement in the Muslim community to marry non-Muslim women and
convert them to Islam, was first validated by the High Court of Kerala in
Asokan KM v Supt of Police. In this case, the honourable judges raised doubts
about the genuineness of Akhila’s conversion from Hinduism to Islam (asfter
which her name was HAdiya), as well as on her marriage to Shafin Jahan, a
Muslim man. Though this judgement was overruled by the Supreme Court of
India,159 the narrative has found legitimacy in the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of
Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020.160 This ordinance, promulgated in the northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh (ruled by the same Hindunationalist party that forms the majority of the national government of India),
seeks to prohibit inter-religious marriages ‘for the sole purpose of conversion’,
and criminalises ‘conversion by marriage’. While the ordinance itself does not
specify conversion to Islam, the narrative surrounding its promulgation, as
well as its subsequent application, has clearly targeted Muslim men seeking
157
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to marry Hindu women.161 Similarly, the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019
underscores the second-class status of Muslim identity in India, by allowing
undocumented immigrants from neighbouring countries to apply for Indian citizenship provided they are not Muslim,162 In this politically divisive, anti-minority context of India,163 therefore, it is not difficult to see the 2019 Act being
operationalised as a tool to secure and extend the incarceration of Muslim
men.164
At this point, it would be valuable to consider, briefly, whether constitutional rights-based jurisprudence can serve as a guide to this discussion on
criminalisation. In KS Puttaswamy v Union of India (Puttaswamy II),165 the
Supreme Court of India laid down the criteria that must be met by a measure
that seeks to restrict a right:
…a measure restricting a right must, first, serve a legitimate
goal (legitimate goal stage); it must, secondly, be a suitable
means of furthering this goal (suitability or rational connection stage); thirdly, there must not be any less restrictive but
equally effective alternative (necessity stage); and fourthly,
the measure must not have a disproportionate impact on the
right-holder (balancing stage).
In my opinion, this criterion can and should inform decisions on (de)
criminalisation because criminal law (as previously discussed in III.A and in
this section), by its very nature, restricts the freedom and autonomy of the
individual, and can potentially deprive them of their right to personal liberty.
The decision to criminalise the pronouncement of triple talaq does restrict,
on the face of it, the freedom of speech and expression protected by Article
161
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19(1)(a) and threatens, through arrest and imprisonment, the personal liberty
of Muslim men who make such a pronouncement. This is not to suggest that
these rights or freedoms are absolute, but that they are fundamental rights, and
their restriction ought to be justified. So, how does the criminalisation of triple
talaq fare against the criteria for valid restriction of rights?
The detailed discussion in III.A.1 and III.A.2 goes a long way in showing
that the 2019 Act does not have a legitimate goal (since the pronouncement of
triple talaq no longer poses a unique harm and does not qualify as a public
wrong). The discussion in III.B so far has also shown that deterrence is not,
in and by itself, a legitimate goal. The only possible legitimate goal of criminalising triple talaq might be to prevent and punish the accompanying harms
of pronouncing triple talaq (such as domestic abuse, the loss of the matrimonial home), or to prevent the destitution of Muslim women that might follow
from triple talaq. As regards them, even if it is accepted that they are legitimate, criminalising the pronouncement of triple talaq is not a suitable way of
furthering them. As previously discussed, the accompanying harms of triple
talaq are not unique to this form of divorce but could potentially result from
any divorce. Criminalising triple talaq, therefore, would do nothing to protect
Muslim women from these harms. Similarly, the destitution faced by Muslim
women on divorce is not attributable to triple talaq (as it might follow from
any form of divorce or abandonment) but to the inability of Muslim women
to enforce maintenance obligations through Court, and the absence of a Statesponsored safety net. It is these underlying causes, then, that the State’s should
seek to address, and criminalising triple talaq has no rational nexus with
these potential aims. Thirdly, since the decision of the Supreme Court had
already declared triple talaq void, enforcing the decision of the Court through
increased awareness within the Muslim community and taking the representatives of the community on board to implement the ban would have been a
more effective and less restrictive way of achieving the aim of preventing
the consequences of triple talaq. Therefore, criminalising triple talaq was not
a necessary step. And finally, since the 2019 Act specifically targets Muslim
men, increasing their carceral vulnerability and prescribing disproportionate
punishment for the pronouncement of triple talaq, it also fails to fulfil the balancing requirement laid down by the Supreme Court of India.
In light of this analysis, therefore, the criminalisation of triple talaq through
the 2019 Act is unprincipled, excessive, and likely to be counterproductive.

V. CONCLUSION
Through this paper, I have provided a multi-pronged critique of the
criminalisation of triple talaq. I argued that the judgement of the Supreme
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Court, and in particular, its misidentification of the ‘wrong’ of triple talaq in
Shayara Bano was not only problematic in itself, it also paved the way for the
incoherent and coercive 2019 Act.
The 2019 Act, which has been the focus of my critique, seeks to criminalise
the practice of triple talaq even though it has already been declared void by
the Supreme Court. As the pronouncement of triple talaq cannot repudiate a
marriage, it is wholly unclear what the Act is criminalising. In the absence of a
clear object of criminalisation, the 2019 Act is arbitrary. Furthermore, the invocation of criminal sanction against triple talaq, being devoid of any theoretical
rationale or foundation, is unjustified. Stripped of its power to effect divorce,
the talaq utterance can no longer cause harm that would merit criminalisation
and is excluded, at the threshold, by the ‘harm’ principle. Assessed, arguendo,
against legal moralism, it was found that the criminalisation of triple talaq
does not meet the more rigorous and universal moral standard of ‘public
wrong’ as well as the specifically Indian standard of Constitutional morality.
The criminalisation of the talaq utterance was then considered as potentially a
malum prohibitum type offence but could not meet the high stakes imposed on
such offences by utilitarians, nor could it be justified against the contractarian
rationale of maintaining the cooperative social exercise through prevention.
Given the recent judgement of the Delhi High Court on the subject, I
engaged also with deterrence as a justification for criminalisation. However, it
was rejected in principle, for failing to meet a basic wrongfulness standard. It
was also rejected from a consequentialist perspective, for failing to prevent the
‘harm’ sought to be addressed.
Finally, I argued that in addition to being unprincipled, the 2019 Act is
against the interests of the Muslim community in general, and of Muslim
women in particular, especially given the obvious anti-Muslim bias of the
Hindu nationalist party in power which has enacted it. It is plainly an exercise
in othering through criminalisation, which increases the carceral vulnerability
of Muslim men. Based on these arguments, I demonstrated that the 2019 Act,
which threatens both the right to freedom of speech and expression and the
personal liberty of Muslim men who say the words ‘talaq, talaq, talaq’ to their
wives, does not meet the Supreme Court of India’s standards for the legitimate
restriction of fundamental rights as laid down in Puttaswamy II. For these
reasons, the criminalisation of the triple talaq through the 2019 Act requires
urgent reconsideration.

